Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions

Martin Dufwenberg and Werner Güth ()

No 1997-12, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: noncooperative games; duopoly; organizational behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1998)
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1998)
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1997)
Working Paper: Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions (1997)
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