Ranking of Job Applicants, On-the-Job Search and Persistent Unemployment

Stefan Eriksson and Nils Gottfries ()

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: We formulate an efficiency wage model with on-the-job search where wages depend on turnover and employers may use information on whether the searching worker is employed or unemployed as a hiring criterion. We show theoretically that ranking by employment status affects both the level and the persistence of unemployment and numerically that these effects are substantial. More prevalent ranking in Europe compared to the US -because of more rigid wage structures etc. - could potentially help to exp lain the high and persistent European unemployment.

Keywords: WORKERS' REPRESENTATION; UNEMPLOYMENT; LABOUR MARKET; EMPLOYMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment (2005)
Working Paper: Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment (2000)
Working Paper: Ranking of Job Applicants, On-the-job Search and Persistent Unemployment (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:2000:3

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