The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations

Marie Claire Villeval and Manfred Konigstein

No 508, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multi-issue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining.

Keywords: Bargaining agenda; Efficient contracts; Right-to manage; Decision authority; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 J51 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2005/0508.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations (2005)
Working Paper: The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations (2005)
Working Paper: The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0508

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