Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence
Marie Claire Villeval (),
Nabanita Datta Gupta () and
Anders Poulsen ()
No 512, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon
Male and female choices differ in many economic situations, e.g., on the labor market. This paper considers whether such differences are driven by different attitudes towards competition. In our experiment subjects choose between a tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than women. Women are mainly influenced by their degree of risk aversion, but men are not. Men compete more against men than against women, but compete against women who are thought to compete. The behavior of men seems primarily to be influenced by social norms whose nature and origin we discuss.
Keywords: Bargaining agenda; Efficient contracts; Right-to manage; Decision authority; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 J51 J53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence (2005)
Working Paper: Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evidence (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0512
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