Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Valeria Maggian and Marie Claire Villeval

No 1337, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find strong aversion to lying at all ages. Lying is driven mainly by selfish motives and envy. Children with stronger social preferences are less prone to deception, even when lying would benefit others at no monetary cost. Older children lie less than younger children and require more selfjustification to lie.

Keywords: Lie aversion; deception; social preferences; children; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2016)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2016)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2015)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2014)
Working Paper: Social Preferences and Lying Aversion in Children (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1337

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