Social preferences and lying aversion in children

Valeria Maggian and Marie Claire Villeval

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 3, No 8, 663-685

Abstract: Abstract While previous research has shown that social preferences develop in childhood, we study whether this development is accompanied by reduced use of deception when lies would harm others, and increased use of deception to benefit others. In a sample of children aged between 7 and 14, we find strong aversion to lying at all ages. Lying is driven mainly by selfish motives and envy. Children with stronger social preferences are less prone to deception, even when lying would benefit others at no monetary cost. Older children lie less than younger children and use self-justification to lie.

Keywords: Lying aversion; Deception; Social preferences; Children; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2016)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2015)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2014)
Working Paper: Social preferences and lying aversion in children (2013)
Working Paper: Social Preferences and Lying Aversion in Children (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9459-7

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