EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Dark Side of Competition for Status

Gary Charness (), David Masclet () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

No 1431, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-group rivalry.

Keywords: Status; ranking; feedback; sabotage; doping; competitive preferences; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 M54 D63 J28 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (77) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2014/1431.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014)
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1431

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-16
Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1431