If Wages Fell During a Recession
Joy Buchanan and
Daniel Houser ()
No 1072, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
Many economies exhibit downward wage rigidity. Surveys of managers indicate that employers hold wages rigid because they believe morale will suffer after a wage cut. Otherwise, there is little evidence for how employersâ€™ beliefs contribute to wage rigidity and whether those beliefs are accurate. Our design allows us to compare beliefs and effort rigorously. We demonstrate that effort falls after workers experience a wage cut and also that workers form reference points from wage contracts. Despite this partial confirmation of the morale theory as an explanation for wage rigidity, half of the employers in our experiment cut wages and lose money as a result. In a treatment where a recession is oâ†µset by nominal inflation, real wage cuts do not have a significant effect on effort.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1072
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shams Bahabib ().