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Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils

Stephen Smith () and Uwe Jirjahn

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Theories of how nonunion employee representation impacts firm performance, affects market equilibria, and generates externalities on labor and society are synthesized. Mandated works councils in Germany provide a particularly strong form of nonunion employee representation. A systematic review of research on the German experience with mandated works councils finds generally positive effects, though these effects depend on a series of moderating factors and some impacts remain ambiguous. Finally, key questions for empirical research on nonunion employee representation, which have previously been little analyzed in the literature, are reviewed.

Keywords: Nonunion representation; works councils; organizational failures; market failures; society (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2017
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http://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2017WP/SmithIIEPWP2017-22.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: THEORY AND THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE WITH MANDATED WORKS COUNCILS (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory and the German Experience with Mandated Works Councils (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2017-22

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