Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games

Paulo Monteiro and Frank Page

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure metric game G has compact strategy spaces, and if its mixed extension G has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of metric games satisfying uniform payoff security.

Keywords: Uniform payoff security; Nash equilibrium; discontinuous games; mixed extension; Sécurisation uniforme des paiements; équilibre de Nash; jeux discontinus; extension mixte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
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Published in 2005

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Related works:
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005)
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005)
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