Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games
Paulo Monteiro and
Frank H. Page Jr. ()
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Frank H. Page Jr.: University of Alabama - Department of Finance, CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure metric game G has compact strategy spaces, and if its mixed extension G has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of metric games satisfying uniform payoff security.
Keywords: Uniform payoff security; Nash equilibrium; discontinuous games; mixed extension; Sécurisation uniforme des paiements; équilibre de Nash; jeux discontinus; extension mixte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00197491v1
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Published in 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005) 
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00197491
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