Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games

Paulo Monteiro and Frank Page

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure metric game G has compact strategy spaces, and if its mixed extension G has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of metric games satisfying uniform payoff security

Keywords: Uniform payoff security; Nash equilibrium; discontinuous games; mixed extension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005)
Working Paper: Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games (2005)
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