Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Herrade Igersheim

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Abstract: This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

Keywords: Arrow's theorem; Pareto principle; Sen's liberal paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-29
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2005, 4 (13), pp.1-6

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Related works:
Journal Article: Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem (2005)
Working Paper: Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (2005)
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