Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Herrade Igersheim

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Abstract: This note shows that results similar to Arrow's ImpossibilityTheorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by aweaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) tostate another version of Sen's liberal paradox. Our resultstrengthens Xu's arguments for taking into account non-welfaristinformation into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

Keywords: collective choice; Arrow's Impossibility Theorem; weak Pareto principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2005, 4 (13), pp.1-6

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Related works:
Journal Article: Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem (2005)
Working Paper: Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00332792

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