Extending Xu's results to Arrow''s Impossibility Theorem

Herrade Igersheim

Economics Bulletin, 2005, vol. 4, issue 13, 1-6

Abstract: This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen''s liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu''s arguments for taking into account non-welfarist information into the social-choice-theoretic framework.

Keywords: Arrow's; Impossibility; Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-29
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Working Paper: Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (2005)
Working Paper: Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (2005)
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