Do workers benefit from shareholders pressure for information disclosure? An empirical analysis

Corinne Perraudin (), Héloïse Petit and Antoine Reberioux
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Corinne Perraudin: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé

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Keywords: information disclosure; industrial relations; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
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Published in Comparative Analysis of Entreprise Data (CAED), Sep 2010, london, United Kingdom

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Working Paper: Do workers benefit from shareholders pressure for information disclosure? An empirical analysis (2010)
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