Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Guido Friebel () and Wendelin Schnedler

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Abstract: We investigate the costs and bene_ts of managerial interventions with a team in which workers care to di_erent degrees about output. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions by the manager may have destructive e_ects: they can distort how workers perceive their co-workers and may lead to a reduction of e_ort by those workers who care most about output. Moreover, interventions may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational culture in which workers trust each other.

Keywords: team work; incentives; informed principal; intrinsic motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00978261
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, 78 (1-2), pp.1. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.003⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control (2011)
Journal Article: Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control (2011)
Working Paper: Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control (2007)
Working Paper: Team Governance: Empowerment of Hierarchical Control (2007)
Working Paper: Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00978261

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.003

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