Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games

Douadia Bougherara, Sandrine Costa (), Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez
Additional contact information
Sandrine Costa: LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this 'protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Keywords: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (4), pp.3194-3202

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games (2009)
Working Paper: Dealing with the aversion to the sucker’s payoff in public goods game (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01072317

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().