Dealing with the aversion to the sucker’s payoff in public goods game

Douadia Bougherara, Sandrine Costa, Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2009-27.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games (2009)
Working Paper: Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:09-27

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