Escaping the zero-sum game of positional races

Gilles Grolleau (), Igor Galochkin and Angela Sutan

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Abstract: Positional races are frequently described as zero-sum games implying that winners are exactly offset by losers. From the social welfare viewpoint, these races are wasteful. We develop several mechanisms allowing individuals to cope with the zero sum nature of rank games and possibly increase their happiness. We provide evidence to support the relevance of these mechanisms in real world settings. Several policy implications are drawn.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Kyklos, 2012, 65 (4), pp.464--479. ⟨10.1111/kykl.12002⟩

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Journal Article: Escaping the Zero-Sum Game of Positional Races (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01994857

DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12002

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