Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Consultative Participation

Brice Corgnet and Roberto Hernán-González
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Roberto Hernán-González: Chapman University, UGR - Universidad de Granada = University of Granada
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberto Hernán González

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Abstract: We study the effect of consultative participation in an experimental principal–agent game, where the principal can consult the agent's preferred option regarding the cost function of the transfer to be implemented in the final stage of the game. We show that consulting the agent was beneficial to principals as long as they followed the agent's choice. Ignoring the agent's choice was detrimental to the principal because it engendered negative emotions and low levels of transfers. Nevertheless, the majority of principals were reluctant to change their mind and adopt the agent's proposal. Our results suggest that the ability to change one's own mind is an important dimension of managerial success.

Keywords: organizational behavior; participative decision making; principal–agent model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Management Science, 2014, 60 (3), 560-585 p. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2013.1786⟩

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Journal Article: Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Consultative Participation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311951

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1786

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