The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy

Bruno Jullien and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

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Abstract: We propose an analysis of platform competition based on the academic literature with a view towards competition policy. First, we discuss to which extent competition can emerge in digital markets and show which forms it can take. In particular, we underline the role of dynamics, but also of platform differentiation, consumers multi-homing and beliefs to allow competition in platform markets. Second, we analyze competition policy issues and discuss how rules designed for standard markets can perform in two-sided markets. We show that multi-sided externalities create new opportunities for anti-competitive conducts, often related to pricing and contractual imperfections.

Keywords: Networks; Platforms; Markets; Competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Information Economics and Policy, 2020, ⟨10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880⟩

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Journal Article: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2021)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2021)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2020)
Working Paper: The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03095347

DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880

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