Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data

Bruno Jullien and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

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Abstract: We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).

Keywords: Internet; Neutrality; Net-neutrality; Screening; Zero-rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03263856v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, 58, pp.31-62. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data (2018)
Working Paper: Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data (2017)
Working Paper: Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03263856

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007

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