Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data

Bruno Jullien and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, vol. 58, issue C, 31-62

Abstract: We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks’ incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid content).

Keywords: Internet; net-neutrality; screening; zero-rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L51 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data (2018)
Working Paper: Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data (2017)
Working Paper: Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:58:y:2018:i:c:p:31-62

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.007

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