Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Jacques Durieu () and Philippe Solal

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2008-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 56 (3), pp.303-313. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.003⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03423048

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().