Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
Sylvain Béal,
Jacques Durieu () and
Philippe Solal
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Date: 2008-11
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 56 (3), pp.303-313. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.003⟩
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Journal Article: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008) 
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2007) 
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03423048
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.06.003
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