Social norms and economic incentives in firms

Dorothea Kübler, Jörgen Weibull and Steffen Huck
Additional contact information
Dorothea Kübler: Unknown

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise.

Date: 2012-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, vol. 83 (N° 2), pp.173-185. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.005⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Social norms and economic incentives in firms (2012)
Working Paper: Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04299385

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().