Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?

Claude Meidinger (), Jean-Louis Rullière () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Claude Meidinger: TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Jean-Louis Rullière: GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: compensation; experimental economics; free-riding; peer pressure; teamwork (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published in Experimental Economics, 2003, 6 (3), pp.253-272

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2001)
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