Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?

Claude Meidinger (), Jean-Louis Rullière () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Claude Meidinger: TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Keywords: compensation; experimental economics; free-riding; peer pressure; teamwork (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Published in European Association of Labour Economists, Oct 2001, Jyvaskyla, Norway

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2003)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ? (2001)
Working Paper: Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability? (2001)
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