Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation
Tor Eriksson () and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance; (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect.
Keywords: experiment; social motivation; sorting; performance pay; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2008, 68 (2), pp. 412-421. 〈10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.003〉
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Journal Article: Performance-pay, sorting and social motivation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00331753
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