Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard () and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do not always exist in such a context. We then restrict the payoff function, in order to find conditions under which Nash networks always exist. We give two properties : increasing differences and convexity in the first argument of the payoff function, that ensure the existence of Nash networks. It is worth noting that linear payoff functions satisfy the previous properties.

Keywords: Nash networks; two-way flow models; partner heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00574277v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in 2011

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity (2012)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2012)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00574277

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