Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard () and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we pursue the line of research initiated by Haller and Sarangi (2005). We examine the existence of equilibrium networks called Nash networks in the non-cooperative two-way flow model by [Bala and Goyal, 2000a] and [Bala and Goyal, 2000b] in the presence of partner heterogeneity. First, we show through an example that Nash networks in pure strategies do not always exist in such model. We then impose restrictions on the payoff function to find conditions under which Nash networks always exist. We provide two properties--increasing differences and convexity in the first argument of the payoff function that ensure the existence of Nash networks. Note that the commonly used linear payoff function satisfies these two properties.

Keywords: Nash; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2012, 64 (2), pp.152-158. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity (2012)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00728035

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.001

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