Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard () and Sudipta Sarangi
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Christophe Bravard: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Game theory; Nash; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Bargaining, Evolution and Networks: A conference in Honor of Hans Haller, Feb 2011, Bâton Rouge, United States

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity (2012)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2012)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
Working Paper: Existence of Nash Networks and Partner Heterogeneity (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00590315

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