Rationalizable Implementation

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux

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Abstract: We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e. in distinct states it selects distinct outcomes, we show that strict Maskin monotonicity is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.

Keywords: Implementation; Complete information; Rationalizability; Maskin monotonicity; Robust mechanism design; Robust implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (3), pp.1253-1274. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.011⟩

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Chapter: Rationalizable Implementation (2012)
Journal Article: Rationalizable implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2010)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2010)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00654687

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.011

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