Rationalizable Implementation

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux

No 1697R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We also discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.

Keywords: Implementation; Complete information; Rationalizability; Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: CFP 1328
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (May 2011), 146(3): 1253–1274

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Related works:
Chapter: Rationalizable Implementation (2012)
Journal Article: Rationalizable implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2010)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2009)
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