Rationalizable Implementation

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

No 1697, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.

Keywords: Implementation; Complete information; Rationalizability; Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2009-05
Note: CFP 1328
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory (May 2011), 146(3): 1253–1274

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Chapter: Rationalizable Implementation (2012)
Journal Article: Rationalizable implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2011)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2010)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation (2010)
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