Bargaining over a common conceptual space

Nadia Mâagli () and Marco LiCalzi
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Nadia Mâagli: Department of Management [Venice] - University of Ca’ Foscari [Venice, Italy], CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Two agents endowed with different individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually agree to associate a region with the same concept end up rebranding it as a different concept. Finally, we document a conversers' dilemma: such equilibrium outcome is Pareto-dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction.

Keywords: cognitive maps; language differences; semantic bargaining; organisational codes; mental models; stratégies cognitives; différences linguistiques; négociation sémantique; codes organisationnels; modèles mentaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01025079
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Published in 2014

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2014)
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2014)
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2013)
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