Bargaining over a common conceptual space
Marco LiCalzi and
Nadia Mâagli ()
Additional contact information
Nadia Mâagli: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne et Università Ca'Foscari Venezia, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Abstract:
Two agents endowed with different individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually agree to associate a region with the same concept end up rebranding it as a different concept. Finally, we document a conversers' dilemma: such equilibrium outcome is Pareto-dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction
Keywords: Cognitive maps; language differences; semantic bargaining; organisational codes; mental models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2014/14052.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2014) 
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2014) 
Working Paper: Bargaining over a common conceptual space (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14052
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