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Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas An Experiment with Police Commissioners

David Dickinson, David Masclet () and Marie Claire Villeval ()

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Abstract: Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student-subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a game with positive externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) and a similar game with negative externalities. Depending on the treatment, a reward or sanction institution is either exogenously or endogenously implemented. Police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and bear a higher burden of the sanction costs compared to non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, subjects favor rewards over sanctions, but police subjects are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also reward and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote. Our experiment suggests that lab evidence on social dilemma games with positive or negative externalities and enforcement institutions is rather robust.

Keywords: Police; Experiment; Rewards; Sanctions; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Norm enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
Date: 2015-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01137702
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2015, pp.74-85. 〈10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.012〉

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Related works:
Journal Article: Norm enforcement in social dilemmas: An experiment with police commissioners (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas. An Experiment with Police Commissioners (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas. An Experiment with Police Commissioners (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01137702

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.012

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