Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?

Gilles Saint-Paul

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Abstract: We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model with heterogenous workers. ALMPs are modeled as a subsidy to job search, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker affects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions for efficiency are no longer valid: to replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. We also characterize the coalition in favor of ALMP.

Keywords: Active labor market policies; Job matching; Hosios condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Research in Economics, 2015, 69 (1), pp.26-36. ⟨10.1016/j.rie.2014.11.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can Active Labor Market Policy Be Counter-Productive? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01314291

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.11.001

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