Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?

Gilles Saint-Paul

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model. ALMPs are modelled as a subsidy to job search. Workers di¤er in their productivity, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker a¤ects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions are no longer valid. To replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. The coalition in favor of ALMP is also studied.

Keywords: Active labor market policy; Matching models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-ger
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://pjse.hal.science/hal-01084570v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://pjse.hal.science/hal-01084570v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can Active Labor Market Policy Be Counter-Productive? (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01084570

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().