Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?

Gilles Saint-Paul

Research in Economics, 2015, vol. 69, issue 1, 26-36

Abstract: We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model with heterogenous workers. ALMPs are modeled as a subsidy to job search, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker affects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions for efficiency are no longer valid: to replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. We also characterize the coalition in favor of ALMP.

Keywords: Active labor market policies; Job matching; Hosios condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can Active Labor Market Policy Be Counter-Productive? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:69:y:2015:i:1:p:26-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.11.001

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