How Strong are the Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining? Experimental Evidence

Fabio Galeotti, Maria Montero and Anders Poulsen ()

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Keywords: equality; efficiency; bargaining; communication; experiment; independence of irrelevant alternatives; attraction; compromise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-09
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Published in 7th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics, Jun 2016, Cergy Pontoise, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01418307

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