How Strong are the Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining? Experimental Evidence
Maria Montero () and
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Anders Poulsen: School of economics - UEA - University of East Anglia [Norwich]
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Keywords: equality; efficiency; bargaining; communication; experiment; independence of irrelevant alternatives; attraction; compromise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in 7th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics, Jun 2016, Cergy Pontoise, France. 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01418307
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