Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups?
Tjaša Bjedov,
Simon Lapointe,
Thierry Madiès () and
Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Tjaša Bjedov: Swiss Distance Learning University
Thierry Madiès: UNIFR - Université de Fribourg = University of Fribourg
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Abstract:
Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a configuration that includes no global good for interacting only within their local group. Voting for such a configuration is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.
Keywords: break-up of groups; voting behavior; public goods; Decentralization; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01882108v1
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Citations:
Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, 51 (4), pp. 681-716. ⟨10.1007/s00355-018-1133-5⟩
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018) 
Working Paper: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018) 
Working Paper: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018) 
Working Paper: Does Decentralization of Decisions Increase the Stability of Large Groups? (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01882108
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1133-5
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