Does Decentralization of Decisions Increase the Stability of Large Groups?

Tjaša Bjedov (), Simon Lapointe, Thierry Madies () and Marie Claire Villeval
Additional contact information
Tjaša Bjedov: Distance Learning University of Switzerland
Thierry Madies: University of Fribourg

No 11364, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.

Keywords: break-up of groups; decision rights; voting behavior; public goods; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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Published - revised version published in: Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, 51 (4), 681-716

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018)
Working Paper: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018)
Working Paper: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018)
Working Paper: Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? (2018)
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