Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game

Giuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli (pierpaolo.battigalli@unibocconi.it), Elena Manzoni and Rosemarie Nagel

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Abstract: We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees' belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.

Date: 2019-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 167, pp.341-360. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002⟩

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Journal Article: Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game (2019)
Working Paper: Belief-dependent Preferences and Reputation: Experimental Analysis of a Repeated Trust Game (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01948364

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002

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