Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
Giuseppe Attanasi (),
Pierpaolo Battigalli (),
Elena Manzoni () and
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 167, issue C, 341-360
We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
Keywords: Repeated psychological game; Reputation; Guilt; Almost complete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game (2019)
Working Paper: Belief-dependent Preferences and Reputation: Experimental Analysis of a Repeated Trust Game (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:167:y:2019:i:c:p:341-360
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