Does intrafirm bargaining matters in the large firm's matching model?

Pierre Cahuc and Etienne Wasmer

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Abstract: We analyze the role of intrafirm bargaining in the large-firm matching model and underline the conditions under which the Pissarides equivalence between this model and the "single-worker" firm's model holds.

Keywords: Wage Bargaining; Large Firm; Matching Model; Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2001, 5 (5), pp.742-747. ⟨10.1017/S1365100501031042⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: DOES INTRAFIRM BARGAINING MATTER IN THE LARGE FIRM'S MATCHING MODEL? (2001)
Working Paper: Does intrafirm bargaining matters in the large firm's matching model? (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03588672

DOI: 10.1017/S1365100501031042

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