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What did you do before? Moral (in)consistency in pro-environmental choice

Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez
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Sophie Clot: UOR - University of Reading
Gilles Grolleau: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
Lisette Ibanez: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: Rather than just examining moral licensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at an individual level. We also propose a formal definition of moral consistency or inconsistency (i.e., moral licensing and/or moral cleansing). We found that half our sample present inconsistent pro-environmental behaviour, independently of the way behavior is elicited (positive or negative framing). Men seem to behave more consistently over time, but when they compensate, they license (respectively cleanse) in a higher (respectively lesser) extent than women. We suggest that policies can improve their performances by avoiding a ‘one size fits all approach' and take into account this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.

Keywords: taking game; dictator game; moral in(consistency); licensing; cleansing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp and nep-hme
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01954925
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