What did you do before? Moral (in)consistency in pro-environmental choice
Gilles Grolleau () and
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Sophie Clot: UOR - University of Reading
Lisette Ibanez: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier
CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro
Rather than just examining moral licensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at an individual level. We also propose a formal definition of moral consistency or inconsistency (i.e., moral licensing and/or moral cleansing). We found that half our sample present inconsistent pro-environmental behaviour, independently of the way behavior is elicited (positive or negative framing). Men seem to behave more consistently over time, but when they compensate, they license (respectively cleanse) in a higher (respectively lesser) extent than women. We suggest that policies can improve their performances by avoiding a ‘one size fits all approach' and take into account this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.
Keywords: taking game; dictator game; moral in(consistency); licensing; cleansing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp and nep-hme
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Working Paper: What did you do before? Moral (in)consistency in pro-environmental choice (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-01954925
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