Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment
Adrian Beck,
Rudolf Kerschbamer,
Jianying Qiu and
Matthias Sutter
Additional contact information
Adrian Beck: Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck
No 436, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.
Keywords: Promises; Guilt; Trust; Credence Goods; Experts; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2010-03-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22132 (text/html)
Related works:
Working Paper: Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services - Theory and Experiment (2010) 
Working Paper: Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services: Theory and Experiment (2010) 
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